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STATUTORY NOTES

a desirable goal, because, despite the Act's laudable purposes, the time is
ripe to change this legislation, for "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. .... ,,48
Charles E. Beck

OF PERSONS NOT QUALIFIED To VOTE-EXPANSION
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE As A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
To STATE LAWS DISFRANCHISING FELONS-TEX. CONST. ART. VI, § 1;

VOTING-CLASSES

TEX. ELECTION CODE ANN.

Art. 5.01 (1963).

Four classes of persons are presently excluded from exercising the right
to vote in Texas.' The first three classes are the young, the feeble-minded,
and the paupers who are dependent on the county. The final category excludes "[all persons convicted of any felony ' 2 whose civil rights have not
been restored.
From its inception as a republic, Texas has prevented certain of its citizens from voting. Today's disfranchisement statute is merely an abridged version of past enactments. 3 Philosophically, the state constitutional conventions
have considered it unwise to allow all citizens to vote, especially those "convicted of certain crimes on the basis that . . . the polls should be guarded
against unsafe elements."' 4 At the most recent constitutional gathering, the
48. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367, 84 S. Ct. 1316, 1320, 12 L. Ed. 2d 377,
382 (1964).
1. The Texas constitutional and statutory provisions are practically identical.
TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1 provides:
The following classes of persons shall not be allowed to vote in this State, towit:
First: Persons under twenty-one (21) years of age.
Second: Idiots and lunatics.
Third: All paupers supported by any county.
Fourth: All persons convicted of any felony, subject to such exceptions as the
Legislature may make.
TEX. ELECTION CODE ANN. art. 5.01 (1967) provides:
The following classes of persons shall not be allowed to vote in this state:
1. Persons under twenty-one years of age.
2. Idiots and lunatics.
3. All paupers supported by the county.
4. All persons convicted of any felony except those restored to full citizenship and right of suffrage or pardoned.
2. TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 1; TEX. ELECTION CODE ANN. art. 5.01 (1967).
3. The list of crimes which resulted in disfranchisement in Texas has included:
bribery, perjury, forgery, high crimes and misdemeanors. Until 1954, military personnel
were also excluded from voting where they were stationed in Texas. TEx. CONST.
art. VI, § 1 (interpretive comment).
4. Id.
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definition of "certain crimes" was limited to felonies.5
The history of the common law indicates that civil and corporal penalties
often accompanied a criminal conviction. In England, the "attainder" procedure resulted in corruption of blood, forfeiture and the loss of all civil
rights.6 Indeed, disfranchisement would have been considered a minor
hardship compared to the punishments that awaited some felons, such as
branding, whipping and pillory. The "civil death" that accompanied the
commission of a felony in England was intended as a further and continuing
punishment for the perpetrator.7 While the sanctions may not have been as
severe, the early history of the United States shows an adoption of the notion that convicted felons have somehow forfeited (among other rights) the
right to vote.8
In recent years, many of the traditional barriers to voting have fallen as
both courts and Congress assumed a more active role in determining qualifications for voting. 9 The restrictions remaining in other states resemble
those still existing in Texas. Generally, age, soundness of mind, and prior
conviction for felony or serious crime endure as barriers to total enfranchisement.
Attacks on the constitutionality of disfranchisement of felons have been
relatively infrequent. Traditionally, courts have upheld state disfranchising
laws. 10 Until recently federal courts rarely allowed the constitutionality issue to be raised before a three-judge court as required by 28 U.S.C. §
2281.11 The refusal usually rested on the court's determination that the
plaintiff felon had failed to raise a sufficient federal question. This posi5. Id.
6. Special Project-The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23
VAND. L. REv. 929, 942-45 (1970).
7. Id. at 944.
8. Du Fresne, The Case for Allowing "Convicted Mafiosi to Vote for Judges":
Beyond Green v. Board of Elections of New York City, 19 DE PAUL L. REv. 112,
113 (1969).
9. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1970); Dillenberg v.
Kramer, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1972); Hayes v. Williams, 341 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.
Tex. 1972); Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182 (D.N.J. 1970); Otsuka v. Hite,
51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966).
10. See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S. Ct. 801, 9 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1963);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S. Ct. 590, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1958); Davis v. Beason,
133 U.S. 333, 10 S. Ct. 299, 33 L. Ed. 637 (1890).
11. An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of
such state in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by
an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be
granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the constitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by
a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970); see, e.g., Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968); Hayes v. Williams, 341 F. Supp. 182
(S.D. Tex. 1972).
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tion was not without precedent, for our judicial history is laden with cases
supporting the idea that the power to set voter qualifications is reserved to
12
the states.
The theory that deprivation of voting rights is merely an additional punishment for the felon has necessarily been modified over the years. A policy of disfranchisement based on the punishment theory would no longer
withstand a constitutional challenge alleging it to be a bill of attainder. A
new justification was given birth in 1884 by the case of Washington v.
State.' 3 The Alabama Supreme Court held that the states are obliged to "preserve the purity of the ballot box" by excluding those who have become
"unfit" to vote as a result of felony conviction.' 4 The more recent case of
Trop v. Dulles' 5 expresses a similar opinion in holding that the exclusion of
felons from voting is not punishment but a "nonpenal exercise of the power
to regulate the franchise."' 6 The test used by this line of cases places a
much heavier burden on the plaintiff to justify his constitutional challenge
than on the state to meet it: "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside
as the denial of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it."'1 7 Even if a citizen were otherwise qualified
to vote, the mere fact that he had been convicted of a felonious crime was
The United States
sufficient to justify his exclusion from the franchise.'
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit best expressed the feeling of those who
would maintain present exclusions based on convictions when it held:
[I]t can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that
perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the legislators who make the laws, the executives who enforce these, the prosecutors who must try them for further violations, or the judges who are
to consider their cases. This is especially so when account is taken of
12. See, e.g., Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 24 S. Ct. 573, 45 L. Ed. 817 (1904);

Pirtle v. Brown, 118 F.2d 218 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 621 (1941); Morgan
v. Katzenbach, 247 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 384 U.S.

641, 86 S. Ct. 1717, 16 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1966); Stuard v. Thompson, 251 S.W. 277
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1923, no writ); Savage v. Umphries, 118 S.W. 893
(Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ).
13.

75 Ala. 582 (1884).

14. The presumption is, that one rendered infamous by conviction of [a] fel-

ony, or other base offense indicative of great moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise

the privilege of suffrage, or to hold office, upon terms of equality with freemen
who are clothed by the state with the toga of political citizenship.

It is proper,

therefore, that this class should be denied a right, the exercise of which might
sometimes hazard the welfare of communities, if not that of the state itself, at least
in close political contests.
id. at 585.
15. 356 U.S. 86, 78 S. Ct. 590, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1958).

16. Id. at 97, 78 S. Ct. at 596, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 640.
17. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 584, 55 S. Ct. 538, 540,

79 L. Ed. 1070, 1072 (1935), cited in Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968).

18. Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D. Fla.), affd mem., 396
U.S. 12, 90 S. Ct. 153, 24 L. Ed. 2d 11 (1969).
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the heavy incidence of recidivism and the prevalence of organized
crime. ....
A contention that the equal protection clause requires
New York to allow convicted mafiosi to vote for district attorneys or
judges would not only be without merit but as obviously so as anything
can be.' 9
As a result of the traditional "hands-off" approach to state disfranchising
laws, a multiplicity of standards has been set up by the various states. 20 Remarkable differences exist between states as to which crimes, if any, result
in disfranchisement. The confusion is increased when it is realized that
states must deal not only with their own definitions of disfranchising crimes,
but, as regards out-of-state convictions, with those of other jurisdictions as
well.
One of the most recent cases following the majority view on the constitutionality of disfranchisement of felons is Hayes v. Williams 21 which specifically upholds the constitutionality 'of the Texas statutory and constitutional
provisions. The Hayes case was a suit by a felon who sought to run for the
Texas Legislature but was barred as candidates are required to be "qualified voters." His constitutional challenge of the Texas disfranchisement law
was based, in part, upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In denying the request for submission to a three-judge panel, the court
made a direct analogy between the Hayes case and Green v. Board of Elections.22 The court asserted that the rationale used by the Green court in
supporting the statute was similar to that which motivated the writers of the
Texas Constitution:
A man who breaks the laws he has authorized his agent to make for
his own governance could fairly have been thought to have abandoned
the right to participate in further administering the compact.238
This reasoning suggests how philosophically close the penalty theory is to the
"purity of the ballot box" theory. When the Hayes court quotes from the
Green decision a passage to the effect that the felon has abandoned his
right to participate, it might just as well have said that a criminal conviction
is punishable, not only by imprisonment or fine, but also by deprivation of
one's civil rights. Inasmuch as the right to vote is widely recognized as
the guarantor of all rights, 24 when a citizen is deprived of the franchise, has
19. Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968).
20. See Note, The Equal Protection Clause as a Limitation on the State's Power
to Disfranchise Those Convicted of a Crime, 21 RUToERS L. REv. 297 (1967).
21. 341 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
22. 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968).
23. Id. at 451, cited in Hayes v. Williams, 341 F. Supp. 182, 189 (S.D. Tex.
1972).
24. E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 1071, 30 L. Ed.
220, 226 (1886).
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he not become something less than a citizen with something less than full
rights?
The Hayes court pursued the line of least resistance by taking the traditional approach to the equal protection clause. The court apparently did
not feel it necessary to extend its constitutional justification of the Texas
law much beyond the reasoning found in the Green opinion.
In doing
so, however, it ignored a series of decisions initiated within the last decade
suggesting a trend toward more successful attacks on the disfranchisement
statutes.
One jurist who did take serious note of the new trend toward greater judicial intervention in voting qualification laws was Justice Harlan. On several occasions he expressed his disfavor with the new trend through lengthy
dissenting opinions.2 5 It was his contention that those who framed and ratified the fourteenth amendment had no intention of allowing its use as a
26
guarantor of voting rights.
Attacks on disfranchisement laws have been made using a variety of
constitutional provisions, but were generally unsuccessful 27 until the Supreme
Court began expanding the role of the fourteenth amendment into the voting
area. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,28 the Court cited Reynolds v.
Sims 29 in holding that the states' prerogative in the voting area is limited to
the setting of nondiscriminatory standards:
[T]he right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a
free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote
must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.30
The most important part of the opinion is that dealing with the historical
flexibility of the equal protection clause:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of
a particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue
25. See Justice Harlan's dissenting opinions in: Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-

tions, 383 U.S. 663, 680, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 1089, 16 L. Ed. 2d 169, 180 (1966); Carring-

ton v. Rash, 280 U.S. 89, 97, 85 S. Ct. 775, 781, 13 L. Ed. 2d 675, 681 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1395, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 543 (1964).
26. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 607, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1405, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506,
553 (1964).
27. Special Project-The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23
VAND. L. RaV. 929, 983-84 (1970).
28. 383 U.S. 663, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 16 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1966).
29. 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964).
30. Id. at 561-62, 84 S. Ct. at 1381, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 506, cited in Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 1082, 16 L. Ed. 2d
169, 173 (1966).
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of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental
rights. Notions of what constitutes 1equal treatment for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause do change.3
Less than 2 months after the Harper decision, the California Supreme Court
handed down an opinion that applied the newly-widened scope of the equal
protection clause to that state's disfranchisement statute.8 2 The law excluded those who had been convicted of "infamous crimes." The test applied was that the state must have a "compelling interest in abridging the
right [of voting], and that in any event such restrictions must be drawn with
narrow specificity." 33 The court did not deny that grounds might conceivably be found to exclude felons. It required, however, that in determining
who will be excluded, the nature of the crime should be determinative. 3 4 The
significance of this standard is that it marks a turning away from the easily
applied, but less defensible, process of excluding all members of a class
(felons) per se. By looking beyond the mere existence of a criminal record, there is a judicial recognition that felons deserve to be treated as individuals much as their "clean" fellow citizens. The case of Otsuka v.
Hite88 marks the first time this idea, expressed previously by the Supreme
Court, 36 was applied to the disfranchisement of felons controversy.
In 1970, a three-judge federal court found the New Jersey disfranchise87
ment statute unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause.
In doing so, the court used the reasoning of the Supreme Court case of Evans
v. Cornman88 that held unconstitutional a Maryland law excluding residents
of federal reservations from voting:
While disfranchising classifications may be permissible, they are,
under the fourteenth amendment, decidedly suspect. They may only
to the achievement of
be justified if they bear a rational relationship
89
a discernable and permissible state goal.
By the time of the Stephens v. Yeomans 40 decision, the new trend of broadly
interpreting the fourteenth amendment had become so widely accepted that
31. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 1083,
16 L. Ed. 2d 169, 174 (1966) (court's emphasis) (citations omitted).
32. Otsuka v. Hite, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966).
33. Id. at 288.
34. [T]he inquiry must focus more precisely on the nature of the crime itself,
and determine whether the elements of the crime are such that he who has committed it may reasonably be deemed to constitute a threat to the integrity of the
elective process.
Id. at 294.
35. 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966).
36. See, e.g., Carrington v. Rush, 380 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 775, 13 L. Ed. 2d 675
(1965).
37. Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182 (D.N.J. 1970).
38. 398 U.S. 419, 90 S. Ct. 1752, 26 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1970).
39. Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182, 1186 (D.N.J. 1970).
40. 327 F. Supp. 1182 (D.N.J. 1970).
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the court could easily excuse Justice Harlan's vigorous dissents as merely his41
torical dicta.
When the Supreme Court spoke on the subject of disfranchisement last
year, it became apparent that the new composition of the Court had not
slowed the trend toward expansion of the equal protection clause. The
Court's test recites the most stringent standards yet for the states in defending equal protection challenges:
To decide whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we look, in
essence, to three things: the character of the classification; the individual interests affected by the classification; 42and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.
As pointed out in Dillenburg v. Kramer,43 the new standards are more
than ever concerned with protecting the rights of the individual. It is no
longer sufficient that a disfranchisement classification is somehow rationally
connected with a legitimate goal of government:
[I]t is certainly clear now that a more exacting test is required for any
statute that places a condition on the exercise of the "right to vote."
. . . If a challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens
and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether
44
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
The Dillenburg opinion refers favorably to the Stephens and Otsuka cases
as two cases which achieved the rare distinction of dealing with the real issue in the disfranchisement debate, that is, whether the classifications have
anything to do with preserving the integrity of the election process or if there
is any genuine distinction between offenses which disfranchise and those
45
which do not.
A logical extension of the current trend is the implication that, in the near
future, the courts will determine that the "constitutionally valid distinction"
has ceased to exist. As more emphasis is placed on protecting individual
rights, the burden of showing an overriding state interest will become increasingly difficult to meet. An evaluation of the current state of the case law
suggests that the courts have started to ask the right questions.
Society has long given lip service to the goal of rehabilitating its criminals
as well as punishing them. Were the courts to take judicial notice of this
41. Justice Harlan's view has not prevailed, and it is now established that a state
voter classification disfranchising resident citizens must pass equal protection
muster under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 1185.
42. Duan v. Blumstein, - U.S. -, -, 92 S. Ct. 995, 999, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274,
280 (1972).
43. - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1972). The court granted a hearing before a three-judge
panel in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2281.
44. Dunn v. Blumstein, -

U.S. -,

-,

92 S. Ct. 995, 999, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274,

281 (1972) (court's emphasis), cited in Dillenburg v. Kramer, 1972).
45. Dillenburg v. Kramer, - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1972).
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goal, a new standard might be called for in the constitutional determination of disfranchisement laws. As a prerequisite to being upheld, it might
be asked concerning the law: Can this statute be justified in light of the national goal of rehabilitation and readmission of the felon into society?
Ideally, the criminal offender, through rehabilitation, is prepared for reentry into society. Having the necessary tools and emotional state of mind
that rehabilitation allegedly provides him, the ex-con is supposed to make a
smooth adjustment to the outside world. Realizing that he has "paid his
debt to society," the rehabilitated criminal should encounter few problems
in being accepted. That this ideal transition back to the "world" is not the
standard pattern is a matter of common knowledge. Even after release, a
felon's fellow citizens are often only too willing to remind him of his special
status. 46 The last thing the felon needs or wants is to be treated differently. By being singled out as not deserving of the vote, the offender is reminded again of his second-class citizenship. It is probably too much to
expect that he will begin following the standards of a society that has deprived him of an effective legal voice, the vote.
The irony of this situation is compounded by the knowledge that some
states allow a felon to vote as soon as he is released from prison. 47 In most
states, the felon is required to apply for restoration of his civil rights in order to regain the vote.48 The fact that the power to pardon is discretionary
tends to discourage applications. Respect for the system is not enhanced
when violators of the same laws are treated differently by the pardoning authority.
Isn't the felon, by seeking the vote, showing his intention to complete rehabilitation and assume the obligations of citizenship? Yet it seems that
states which deny automatic reenfranchisement leave little alternative to fel46. Once the offender is released from custody, civil disabilities discourage him from
participating in normal community life by preventing him from engaging in activities
that other members of the community routinely perform. These disabilities pervade
his post-release life, inhibiting his conduct and according him special treatment in
each area regulated. As a consequence, the offender is segregated from society and
cannot pursue an ordinary life. The offender's life style, for example, is radically
changed by many occupational and professional disabilities that frequently prevent
him from practicing his former profession and force him to accept demeaning employment. Moreover, typical requirements that ex-convicts must register with local
authorities may impede some individuals from travel, even to a nearby town. Special
Project-The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv.
929, 1226 (1970).
47. West Virginia allows its released felons to vote, at least by the end of their
terms of conviction. Pennsylvania, New Hampshire and Utah allow most of their released felons to vote except for a minimum number usually limited to those convicted
of election offenses or treason. id. at 976-78. As yet there is no evidence that this
policy has, in any way, had a detrimental effect on the citizens of these states.
48. All states except Rhode Island provide a formalized pardoning procedure of
some type. In Rhode Island, the felon must appeal to the legislature on an individual
basis. Id. at 1143-44.
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